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Abstract
We investigate how moral hazard problems can cause sub-optimal investment in energy efficiency, a
phenomenon known as the energy efficiency gap. We focus on contexts where both the seller and the buyer
of an energy saving technology can take hidden actions. For instance, a home retrofit contractor may cut on
the quality of installation to save costs, while the homeowner may increase her use of energy service when
provided with higher energy efficiency. As a result, neither energy efficiency quality nor energy use are fully
contractible. We formalize the double moral hazard problem and discuss how it can help rationalize the
energy efficiency gap. We then compare two policy instruments: minimum quality standards and energy-
savings insurance. Their relative efficiency depends on the balance between the monitoring costs associated
with the former and the deadweight loss of the consumer’s action induced by the latter. Calibrating the
model to the U.S. retrofit industry, we find that at current market conditions, standards tend to outperform
insurance. We also find that the welfare gains from undoing the double moral hazard are substantially larger
than those from internalizing carbon dioxide externalities associated with underlying energy use.
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21. Introduction
The rationale for government interventions promoting energy efficiency has been debated for
more than three decades. At the heart of the debate are empirical studies finding that people
apply abnormally high discount rates to energy efficiency investment decisions (Hausman
1979; Train 1985). This suggests that some seemingly profitable investment opportunities
are not undertaken.
The phenomenon, known as the energy efficiency gap, was first conceptualized by Jaffe and
Stavins (1994). The authors emphasized the difference between market failure explanations
of the gap (e.g., information asymmetries, technology spill-overs, energy price distortions),
which could justify government intervention, and non-market failure explanations (e.g., con-
sumer heterogeneity, costs and benefits of ancillary attributes), which do not. More recently,
this dichotomy has been enriched with the concept of behavioral anomalies to account for
the fact that consumers may value energy savings in a way that is inconsistent with perfect
rationality (Gillingham and Palmer 2014; Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky 2014).1
In this paper, we aim to contribute to the energy efficiency gap debate by drawing at-
tention to one market failure which, to our knowledge, has been overlooked in the related
literature: moral hazard in the provision of quality in energy efficiency investments. For
instance, the problem was not discussed in the most recent and exhaustive literature reviews
on the energy efficiency gap (Gillingham, Newell, and Palmer 2009; Allcott and Greenstone
2012). We also shed light on little-discussed policy remedies such as energy-savings insurance
and minimum quality standards for energy efficiency professionals.
Many energy efficiency technologies are considered to be credence goods, the performance
of which is never completely known to the buyer (Darby and Karni 1973; Sorrell 2004).
This characteristic is conducive to a variety of information problems, which have long been
suspected to be the main source of market failures in energy efficiency markets (Howarth
and Andersson 1993; Huntington, Schipper, and Sanstad 1994). This is especially true in the
building sector. Technological complexity may complicate understanding of energy-saving
opportunities. However, evaluations of energy audits find that consumers respond less to
information provision than to price signals, suggesting that the knowledge gap is small
(Palmer, Walls, Gordon, and Gerarden 2013; Frondel and Vance 2013; Murphy 2014b).
Still, information may be understandable but asymmetrically shared. Several studies have
1The policy implications of these problems, in particular whether they warrant libertarian paternalistic
interventions, is more debated among economists (Allcott 2014).
3examined information asymmetries in rental housing, in which the landlord is supposedly
more informed than the tenant about the energy efficiency performance of the dwelling. They
find that a higher energy efficiency does not lead to a higher rent and that rented dwellings
are less energy efficient than owner-occupied ones (Levinson and Niemann 2004; Davis 2012;
Gillingham, Harding, and Rapson 2012; Burfurd, Gangadharan, and Nemes 2012; Myers
2013). Fewer studies have examined information asymmetries in home sales, in which the
seller is supposedly more informed than the buyer about the energy efficiency performance
of the dwelling. Research conducted in the Netherlands suggests that information conveyed
by energy performance certificates tends to be capitalized into sale prices, but only weakly
(Brounen and Kok 2011; Murphy 2014a).
The information asymmetries we consider here are related, but different in nature. Our
motivational example consists of investments in building energy retrofit projects in which a
contractor may cut on the quality of installation2 to save costs, while the buyer may rebound,
that is, increase her use of energy services when provided with higher energy efficiency. Both
actions are unobservable to the other party. We refer to this problem as double moral hazard.
Our focus is on the supply side of energy efficiency markets. We thus extend an analysis of
information asymmetries so far confined to building sales and rental transactions.3
Our contribution is threefold. First, we formalize how moral hazard in the provision of
quality leads to an energy efficiency gap. Second, we investigate policy solutions to this
market failure. In the building sector, firms can offer energy-savings insurance (Mills 2003).
We show that due to the unobservable consumer’s response, a complete insurance contract is
not optimal. We also examine professional certification in the form of minimum quality stan-
dards. Compared to insurance, such an instrument does not distort consumer incentives but
incurs some monitoring costs. We suggest that these policies be part of the policy portfolio
used to encourage energy efficiency, beside Pigouvian instruments (Allcott, Mullainathan,
and Taubinsky 2014), energy efficiency subsidies (Ito 2013; Boomhower and Davis 2014),
energy efficiency labels (Houde 2014), building codes (Aroonruengsawat, Auffhammer, and
2Such a quality shortfall may materialize as inefficient labor or capital input. For instance, an insulation
contractor may omit to fill wall cavities before installing insulation panels and/or install insulation panels
of a low grade.
3The hidden actions examined in our paper may propagate as hidden information in subsequent principal-
agent relationships. That is, the contractor’s failure can be internalized as the homeowner’s by prospective
homebuyers or renters, leading to non-capitalization of energy efficiency performance in home sale prices or
rental contracts. We left this fruitful question of the articulation between moral hazard and capitalization
problems for future research.
4Sanstad 2012; Jacobsen and Kotchen 2011) and information provision (Jessoe and Rapson
2014). Our third contribution consists of developing sufficient statistics to assess the mar-
ginal welfare effect of different policy instruments and to quantify the size of the energy
efficiency gap due to moral hazard. We illustrate the accuracy of the approach with sensi-
tivity analysis on a stylized model of the U.S. insulation market calibrated using data from
the U.S. 2009 Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS).
Our numerical simulations suggest that the social costs associated with moral hazard
could be large. We find that for a broad set of parameters capturing different market
environments, the deadweight loss from moral hazard is several times larger than the costs
of quality audits. It is also approximately one order of magnitude larger than those from
internalizing carbon dioxide externalities associated with natural gas use. Moral hazard
problems lead to implied discount rates in the 15-35% range, instead of a 7% rate assumed
in the absence of this market failure. A naive extrapolation of our results to the whole
U.S. population of homeowners that use natural gas for space heating suggests that undoing
moral hazard associated with insulation could save at least 11 billion cubic feet of natural
gas and 0.6 million tons of CO2 annually, hence yielding $2.4 billion of present value benefits.
Energy-savings insurance could close 75% of this gap and minimum quality standards could
be even more welfare-improving.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 exam-
ines energy-savings insurance, quality standards, and provides sufficient statistics of their
marginal welfare effects. We then turn to the data. In section 4, we discuss how to establish
causal evidence of moral hazard problems in the retrofit industry and present some indi-
rect evidence from a unique dataset of random audits in France. In Section 5, we develop
a stylized model of the U.S. home insulation market to compare policy impacts. Section 6
discusses sensitivity analysis and approximations of the deadweight loss. Section 7 concludes.
2. Energy efficiency investments and double moral hazard
Our model builds upon the double moral hazard model of Cooper and Ross (1985). Invest-
ments in energy retrofits for the residential sector, which involve hidden actions from both
the homeowner and the contractor as we explain below, are considered as a canonical exam-
ple. Other situations that give rise to one-sided moral hazard, for instance energy retrofits in
the commercial and industrial sectors, can be viewed as special cases of this general model.
They are occasionally discussed in the text.
52.1. Setup
A homeowner uses energy for space heating. This energy service s, measured in indoor tem-
perature, provides her with value V (s), multiplied by a taste parameter θ > 0 representing
heterogeneity across consumers in the valuation of energy service. The homeowner expects
to pay energy bill pE0(s), where E0(·) is the energy use and p the price of energy. The
energy use may be a random variable influenced by idiosyncratic factors, such as weather
conditions and the architectural characteristics of the house. For simplicity, we use a de-
terministic framework; utility is quasi-linear and there is no risk aversion. The homeowner
sets the intertemporal energy service vector s0θ so as to maximize utility U0(θ, s) over an
investment lifetime of l years, discounted at some rate r:
(1) U0(θ, s) ≡
l∑
t=1
[
θVt(st)− ptE0t (st)
]
(1 + r)−t
The homeowner can invest in retrofits to reduce her energy bill. In this setting, the
homeowner is the principal and the contractor is the agent. Energy use after investment E
is reported on homeowner’s energy bill. Hence, it is common knowledge to both parties. Yet
each one can take hidden actions s and q to influence it.
The homeowner chooses a stream of energy service s. This action is unobserved to the
contractor and a higher energy service will induce a higher energy use. Likewise, the con-
tractor provides a certain quality q in installing an energy-efficient equipment. We assume
that the quality q is unidimensional and can be measured as the number of hours worked
by the contractor. Unlike other amenities, the impact of this action on the energy efficiency
performance cannot be fully assessed by the homeowner. The only thing that is known to
both parties is that a higher quality of installation lowers energy use.
The homeowner considers future discounted benefits with utility U(θ, s, q), pays upfront
cost for the retrofit (T > 0), and receives some fixed non-energy benefits net of the inconve-
nience costs generated by the investment ():
(2) U(θ, s, q) ≡
l∑
t=1
[θVt(st)− ptEt(st, q)] (1 + r)−t − T + 
6In what follows, we assume time invariance of energy price, technology and consumer
value function. We remove t subscripts and consider vector s as a scalar s constant over
time. We further simplify the notations with a discount factor Γ such that:
(3) Γ ≡ Γ(r, l) ≡
l∑
t=1
(1 + r)−t = 1− (1 + r)
−l
r
Firms are homogenous in the industry. The profit of a representative contractor is the
revenue from the sale minus the cost of the quality provided:
(4) Π(q) ≡ T − C(q)
The following assumptions hold (subscripts denote partial derivatives):
Assumption 1: Technology.
(i) At constant consumer behavior s, investment reduces energy use: E(s, q) < E0(s) ∀q ≥
qmin, where qmin is the minimum input.
(ii) Contracting parties’ actions have opposite effects: E0s > 0, Es > 0 and Eq < 0
(iii) Energy savings exhibit decreasing returns: −E0ss ≤ 0, −Ess ≤ 0 and −Eqq ≤ 0
(iv) Contracting parties’ actions are substitutes: Eqs < 0 and Es < E0s
(v) Non-energy benefits are not sufficient to motivate investment:  ≤ C(qmin)
Assumption 2: Behavior and preferences. Contracting parties are (i) value-maximizers,
(ii) risk-neutral and (iii) have twice differentiable, concave value functions: V ′(·) > 0,
V ′′(·) ≤ 0 and −C ′(·) < 0, −C ′′(·) ≤ 0
Assumption 3: Market. The industry is competitive with free entry: Π(q) = 0.
Corollary: T = C(q).
Assumptions 1(i)-(v) are mild: The energy service has a convex effect on energy use,
and quality has diminishing returns on energy savings. Moreover, both factors impede each
other: The marginal increase in energy savings due to increased quality is larger when the
underlying energy service is high (e.g., a house heated in a cold climate) rather than low
(e.g., a house heated in a warm climate). Reciprocally, the marginal increase in energy use
due to increased energy service is lower when the quality installed is high rather than low.
7Assumptions 2(i)-(iii) are meant to be as standard as possible, in order to isolate the
moral hazard problem from possibly interacting market failures and behavioral anomalies.
Their generality is discussed in Section 5.
Assumption 3 is not essential. Whatever the structure of the market, home energy retrofits
are very specific to a bundle of home and homeowner characteristics, and hence do not lend
themselves to arbitrage. A monopolist could thus perfectly price discriminate. This would
not change equilibrium quantities in the model, but only the surplus repartition. Still, the
assumption of perfect competition seems reasonable in the context studied here.4
2.2. Social versus private optimum
We will consider two equilibrium outcomes: a social (hereafter cooperative) optimum c and
a private (hereafter non-cooperative) optimum nc. For any equilibrium situation j ∈ {c, nc},
the agreement between the homeowner and the contractor is a two-stage game that is solved
backward. In the first stage, the homeowner of type θ invests if the net present value
NPV j(θ) of investment is positive, given her beliefs about her future optimal energy service
sjθ and the optimal quality q
j
θ offered to her by the contractor:
(5) NPV j(θ) ≡ U(θ, sjθ, qjθ)− U0(θ, s0θ) ≥ 0
In the second stage, both agents determine their own action given their belief about the
other party’s action. We focus hereafter on this second stage, for a participating consumer
of type θ.
Under perfect information, the contract between the two parties is set cooperatively so
as to maximize joint surplus, subject to boundary conditions s ≥ smin and q ≥ qmin. The
optimal actions scθ and qcθ that solve the first-order conditions for maximization5 below will
be such that their marginal benefit (in terms of value to the consumer and cost savings to
the firm) equates their marginal effect on consumer’s energy bill:
(6) ∀t θV ′ ≤ pEs with equality if scθ > smin
4The home energy retrofit industry is indeed very fragmented. For instance, the heating, ventilation and
air conditioning (HVAC) industry in California is characterized by small firms offering low wages, facing low
barriers to entry and an annual turnover as high as 25% (Zabin, Lester, and Halpern-Finnerty 2011).
5Throughout the paper, the objective functions are well-behaved and the first-order conditions discussed
are necessary and sufficient conditions for maximization.
8(7) C ′ ≥ −pEqΓ with equality if qcθ > qmin
The cooperative optimum (scθ, qcθ) can be characterized as a reaction function equilibrium.
Assuming interior solutions and applying the Implicit Function Theorem to the first-order
conditions, we find that the reaction functions s∗θ(q) and q∗(s) are strictly increasing:
(8) ∀t ds
∗
θ
dq =
pEqs
θV ′′ − pEss > 0
(9) dq
∗
ds =
−pEsq
C ′′/Γ + pEqq
> 0
Now if information is imperfect, the agreement is no longer cooperative. Both parties
maximize their private value, given their beliefs about the other party’s action and subject
to boundary conditions s ≥ smin and q ≥ qmin. While this yields the same reaction function
as in the cooperative agreement s∗θ(q) for the consumer, this does not hold for the contractor.
He fails to internalize the benefits his action delivers to the homeowner and simply chooses
the level of quality qnc that minimizes his cost:
(10) ∀s qnc(s) = arg min
q≥qmin
C(q) = qmin
Proposition 1. For a participating consumer of given type θ:
(i) the private, non-cooperative equilibrium (sncθ , qncθ ) exists and is unique
(ii) the social, cooperative equilibrium (scθ, qcθ) exists and is unique if and only if:
(11) dqds∗θ
>
dq∗
ds
proof: (i) The private equilibrium is uniquely defined as (s∗θ(qmin), qmin). (ii) Likewise,
if for at least one agent his or her optimal cooperative action is a corner solution, then
the social equilibrium is uniquely defined. If optimal actions are interior for both agents,
condition (11) implies that the composite function s∗θ(q∗(s)) defined for all s ≥ smin is a
9contraction mapping. Hence, by the Banach fixed-point theorem, it admits a unique fixed
point.
The following proposition states that the two equilibria will involve unambiguous loca-
tions:
Proposition 2. Assuming condition (11) holds, a participating consumer of given type θ:
(i) is offered a higher level of quality at the social optimum: qcθ ≥ qncθ
(ii) sets her energy service at a higher level at the social optimum: scθ ≥ sncθ > s0θ
(iii) faces a higher net present value at the social optimum: NPV c(θ) ≥ NPV nc(θ)
proof: (i) For a given θ, qcθ ≥ qmin = qncθ . (ii) Since s∗θ(·) is increasing, scθ = s∗θ(qcθ) ≥
s∗θ(qncθ ) = sncθ . For all s, E0s > Es implies Us > U0s . Therefore, assuming interior solutions:
U0s |s0θ = 0 = Us|sncθ > U0s |sncθ . Since U0 is concave in s, U0s is decreasing in s and sncθ > s0θ. (iii)
Comparing net present values NPV c(·) and NPV nc(·) is equivalent to comparing the utility
functions after investment U(θ, scθ, qcθ) and U(θ, sncθ , qncθ ). Under the assumption of perfect
competition, the utility after investment is equivalent to the joint surplus. Therefore, the
net present value of investment is maximized in the social outcome: NPV c(θ) ≥ NPV nc(θ).
Recall from Assumption 1(ii) that q and s have an opposite effect on E(s, q). Hence, if
both inputs increase simultaneously, as is the case when the parties move from the private
optimum to the social optimum, the decrease in energy use due to the increase in quality is
partly offset by the increase in energy service. This phenomenon is known as the rebound
effect. To the extreme, it can backfire, that is, be such that energy use increases after
energy efficiency investments. This case cannot be ruled out from our analysis, as E(scθ, qcθ),
E(sncθ , qncθ ) and E(s0θ) cannot be compared unambiguously.
We shall now make a distinction between two types of backfire rebound effect, which will
prove useful later in the analysis.
Definition 1: Investment backfire rebound effect. An investment backfire rebound
effect occurs if energy use after investment is larger than before investment: s > s0 and
E(s, q) > E0(s0).
Definition 2: Relative backfire rebound effect. A relative backfire rebound effect
occurs between two investment options H and L if energy use after investment is larger in
the more energy efficient option H: qH > qL, sH > sL and E(sH , qH) > E(sL, qL).
10
2.3. Consumer heterogeneity and aggregate welfare
We now turn to a continuum of consumers of mass 1. Consumers are assumed to all live
in a similar dwelling and only differ with respect to their preference for energy service θ.
The higher the value of θ, the higher the demand for energy service, hence the higher the
quality offered by a cooperative firm; in contrast, the quality offered by a non-cooperative
firm remains at minimum. This proposition is demonstrated in Appendix A.
For any equilibrium situation j ∈ {c, nc}, we have, by the Envelope Theorem:
(12) dNPV
j
dθ =
[
V (sjθ)− V (s0θ)
]
Γ
As V (·) is increasing and ∀θ sjθ > s0θ, the net present value of investment strictly increases
with θ. Hence, if there exists a cutoff type θj0 such that NPV j(θj0) = 0, it is unique. In
what follows, we are interested in this most relevant case; alternative cases are discussed in
Appendix B. Assuming that F (·) is the cumulative distribution function of θ, participation
to investment N j is given by:
(13) N j ≡ 1− F (θj0)
Finally, aggregate social welfare is the sum of utility before investment for those consumers
who do not invest (θ ∈ [0, θ0)), plus the utility after investment for those who do invest
(θ ≥ θ0):
(14) W j ≡
∫ θj0
0
U0(θ, s0θ)dF (θ) +
∫ +∞
θj0
U(θ, sjθ, q
j
θ)dF (θ)
Proposition 3. Assuming that condition (11) is satisfied for all consumers with θ > 0:
(i) the social optimum entails higher participation than the private optimum: N c ≥ Nnc
(ii) the social optimum entails higher aggregate welfare than the private optimum: W c ≥ W nc
proof: (i) Assume θc0 (respectively θnc0 ) is the cutoff value of θ in the social (respec-
tively private) optimum. Proposition (2iii) imposes the following inequality: NPV c(θc0) =
0 = NPV nc(θnc0 ) ≤ NPV c(θnc0 ). Since NPV j(·) is increasing, θc0 ≤ θnc0 . Hence, N c −Nnc =
11∫ θnc0
θc0
dF (θ) ≥ 0. (ii)W c−W nc = ∫ θnc0θc0 NPV c(θ)dF (θ)+∫+∞θnc0 [U(θ, scθ, qcθ)−U(θ, sncθ , qncθ )]dF (θ) ≥
0.
This is a very general formalization of the energy efficiency gap: In the presence of moral
hazard, investments in energy efficiency entail too low a quality of installation and too
few homeowners participate. This result holds under very general assumptions of perfect
rationality and risk-neutrality. Concretely, the homeowner does not have the technical skills
to judge whether the retrofit has been properly completed, although she is aware that any
defects will deter the energy performance of the investment. Anticipating that the contractor
is aware of her limitations, she will expect him to save on installation costs and perform the
job poorly. Any claim that he will provide the highest quality, enabling her to maximize
energy savings, will be considered ”cheap talk” by the homeowner. The contractor will not
deviate from these expectations and indeed complete the lowest possible quality job. Quality
will be non-contractible and thus underprovided.
Appendix C discusses some comparative statics with respect to a composite indicator
of all market and behavioral features: ζ ≡ pΓ(r, l). This indicator is very similar to the
investment inefficiency parameter proposed by Allcott and Greenstone (2012). Any value of
p, r or l that does not reflect perfect competition, perfect rationality or perfect information
translates into a biased ζ. Comparative statics of ζ thus provides insight into the interaction
between moral hazard and other market failures or behavioral anomalies.
3. Policies
In this section, we examine some regulatory and incentive-based instruments that can be used
to address moral hazard in energy efficiency markets. We begin with the welfare analysis
and then develop sufficient statistics that could guide future empirical work on the issue.
3.1. Energy-savings insurance
Insurance is the most common way of addressing moral hazard problems. In the energy field,
energy-savings insurance and a variety of energy performance contracts have been offered
for about twenty years in the commercial sector (Mills 2003), less frequently in the residen-
tial sector.6 Such contracts typically have the contractor pay the consumer any shortfall in
energy savings below a pre-agreed baseline. In our simple framework with no risk-aversion,
6GreenHomes America, Inc., NJ-PA Energy Group, LLC. and EcoWatt Energy, LLC. are the few examples
we have found of companies offering energy-savings insurance in the U.S. residential sector.
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insurance can be modeled as a contract in which the contractor bears a share k of the energy
bill:
(15) U(θ, s, q) ≡ [θV (s)− (1− k)pE(s, q)] Γ− I + 
(16) Π(q) ≡ I − C(q)− kpE(s, q)Γ
According to Assumption 3, the payment to the contractor is I = C(q) + k pE(s, q)Γ,
where kpE(s, q)Γ is the actuarially fair insurance premium.
A new, opposite principal-agent relationship superimposes to the previous one: Since the
contractor now provides insurance, he is a principal and the homeowner is an agent. The
implementation of this contract can be solved backward as a three-stage game played by the
parties. In the third stage, each party determines non-cooperatively his or her own effort,
given insurance coverage k and his or her belief about the other party’s action. First-order
conditions for maximization are:
(17) ∀t θV ′ ≤ (1− k)pEs with equality if siθ(k) > smin
(18) C ′ ≥ −kpEqΓ with equality if qiθ(k) > qmin
The optimal consumer’s response is bounded above by a satiation value smax.7 By the
Implicit Function Theorem, the insurance reaction functions s∗∗θ (q, k) and q∗∗(s, k) are both
increasing in k:
(19) ∀t ds
∗∗
θ
dk =
−pEs
θV ′′ − (1− k)pEss > 0
7Without satiation, full insurance (k = 1) would bring the marginal value of energy service in Equation 17
to zero, hence induce infinite energy service. Satiation could be introduced as the argument of the maximum
of a parabolic utility function. Alternatively, in our model, it is introduced as an upper bound on the value
of s. This specification allows for more flexibility in the numerical section, without loss of generality.
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(20) dq
∗∗
dk =
−pEq
C ′′/Γ + kpEqq
> 0
The implementation of such a contract partly solves the moral hazard, as it induces the
contractor to offer some quality (Equation 18). At the same time, however, it gives rise to
a second moral hazard: By lowering the homeowner’s marginal value of energy service, it
induces her to consume more energy. The energy service in Equation 17 is consumed to
the socially optimal level defined by Equation 6 when the consumer is not insured (k = 0),
whereas the quality in Equation 10 is offered to the socially optimal level defined by Equation
7 when the firm offers full insurance (k = 1). Since k cannot be simultaneously equal to 0
and 1, insurance cannot achieve the social optimum. At best, both parties will agree on an
incomplete insurance contract k ∈ (0, 1). We recover here the general result of Cooper and
Ross (1985). For any insurance k, the agreement (siθ(k), qiθ(k)) will be a Nash equilibrium
determined by the intersection of each party’s reaction function s∗∗θ (q, k) and q∗∗(s, k). These
inputs will be higher than in the private optimum; however, their location relative to the
social optimum is ambiguous.
Note that if consumer’s types are imperfectly observable to the contractor, a screening
issue arises. Consumers with the highest use of energy service may self-select into the
insurance contract that offers the highest energy savings coverage. Assuming this away, the
optimal value kˆθ that sustains the Nash equilibrium to each type is determined cooperatively
in the second stage of the game, so as to maximize joint surplus:
(21) ∀θ kˆθ = arg max
k∈[0,1]
[U(θ, siθ(k), qiθ(k)) + Π(qiθ(k))]
The first-order conditions for maximization in the second stage can be found in Appendix
D. Lastly, in the first stage, the homeowner chooses whether or not to invest, depending on
her net present value for the investment and given her beliefs about the contractor’s action
and the optimal insurance coverage.
Note that if the consumer were not optimizing her energy service and consuming a constant
level of it (e.g., a tenant who does not pay for her energy bill, or an employee in a commercial
building), then the second moral hazard would not occur. The optimal insurance contract
would feature full coverage and bring the parties to the social optimum. This can explain
why contractors seem more willing to provide guarantee payments in the commercial sector
than in the residential one.
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3.2. Minimum quality standard
Various types of voluntary quality certifications can be found in the marketplace, most
notably those provided by the Building Performance Institute (BPI) and the Residential
Energy Services Network (RESNET) in the U.S. These programs typically ensure that pro-
fessional workers and contracting companies are trained to the best practices and that their
performance is regularly tested.
In our framework, a minimum quality standard translates into a perfectly enforced min-
imum labour requirement q¯.8 Yet such an instrument may cause two classic types of dead-
weight loss. First, compliance with the standard still needs to be monitored, which generates
monitoring costs M(q¯). These costs do not occur with energy-savings insurance, in which
the object of the contract, namely energy use, is common knowledge. Second, minimum
quality standards abstract from consumer heterogeneity. A minimum standard q¯ can only
be the optimal level of quality to one homeowner type, but it is suboptimal to all others
(since, according to Proposition 1, the optimal quality is unique to each type θ). As a result,
a uniform standard is strictly suboptimal over the population.
The optimal minimum standard will be set at a value q¯ that maximizes the collective
surplus, subject to the participation constraint:
(22)
Maximize
q¯
[∫ θ0
0
U0(θ, s0θ)dF (θ) +
∫ +∞
θ0
[U(θ, s∗θ(q¯), q¯)−M(q¯)] dF (θ)
]
subject to NPV (θ0, s∗θ0(q¯), q¯)−M(q¯) ≥ 0
As developed in Appendix D, the first-order condition for maximization will be:
(23)
∫ +∞
θ0
[
∂U(θ, s∗θ(q¯), q¯)
∂q¯
−M ′
]
dF (θ) = 0
In words, the optimal standard will equalize the sum of marginal disutilities (net of
marginal monitoring costs) of participants for whom the standard is too tight with the sum
of marginal utilities (net of marginal monitoring costs) of participants who would have been
willing to invest beyond the standard.
8In practice, minimum quality standards could target materials used in retrofits and specific tasks.
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3.3. Intervention rules with interacting energy market failures
As we have just seen, energy-savings insurance and quality standards can be used to ad-
dress moral hazard problems. Both instruments are, however, second-best. Uniform quality
standards cannot eliminate the gap, because of the heterogeneity in consumers’ valuation of
energy services and the monitoring costs. Energy-savings insurance is incomplete because
moral hazard is bilateral.
Yet public intervention to address moral hazard problems may not be systematically
justified if they interact with energy market failures. Assume that every unit of energy used
generates a linear external cost px, discounted over the relevant time period with a discount
factor Γx. For instance, px is positive for environmental or energy security externalities, and
negative for average-cost energy pricing. Consumer utility before and after investment is
now:
(24)
U
0
x(θ, s) ≡ U0(θ, s)− pxE0(s)Γx
Ux(θ, s, q) ≡ U(θ, s, q)− pxE(s, q)Γx
These new utility functions allow one to define new net present value NPVx and aggregate
welfare Wx functions as in Equations 5 and 14, respectively. The optimal actions that
internalize external costs are denoted by superscript x.
Proposition 4. In an economy subject to both energy market failures and energy efficiency
moral hazard:
(i) When energy market failures are corrected, it is desirable to also undo moral hazard
problems: W c,xx ≥ W nc,xx
(ii) If no consumer is prone to an investment backfire rebound effect, then it is desirable
to correct energy market failures. This holds whether or not moral hazard problems are
addressed: ∀θ E(scθ, qcθ) ≤ E0(s0θ)⇒ W c,xx ≥ W cx and E(sncθ , qncθ ) ≤ E0(s0θ)⇒ W nc,xx ≥ W ncx
(iii) If consumers are prone to neither an investment nor a relative backfire rebound effect,
then it is desirable to undo moral hazard problems. This holds even if energy market failures
are not corrected: ∀θ E(scθ, qcθ) ≤ E(sncθ , qncθ ) ≤ E0(s0θ)⇒ W cx ≥ W ncx
proof: See Appendix E.
As long as energy efficiency does not backfire, correcting energy market failures is desir-
able, regardless of whether or not the contracting parties overcome the moral hazard. Indeed,
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social welfare cannot be maximized if the parties do not account for the broader distortions
associated with their actions.9 However, the reciprocal needs not be true: If energy market
failures are not (or cannot be) corrected, then it might be desirable to maintain, rather than
undo, the moral hazard. This can actually occur if energy efficiency backfires. As a result,
energy market failures would be larger.
3.4. Sufficient statistics
Deadweight loss from moral hazard on quality. We seek to approximate the dead-
weight loss associated with the quality shortfall caused by the moral hazard: ∆qW ≡
W c − W nc. A first step is to examine the marginal welfare change induced by a mar-
ginal change in quality. Since marginal participants are indifferent between investing and
not investing, we can neglect changes in participation (see Appendix D). Similar envelope
conditions allow us to also neglect the benefits from increased heating comfort. Rewriting
Equation 23 with M(q¯) = 0, the marginal benefits from a higher quality to participating
homeowner are thus:
(25) dWdq¯ = pΓEq − C
′
Integrating between qnc and qc (with qnc ≤ qc according to Proposition 2i) gives the
following approximation for ∆qW :
(26) ∆qW = −p∆qE(snc, q)Γ−∆qC(q)
The error associated with integrating infinitesimal changes is positive and equal to the
private benefits from increased heating comfort and the social benefits from increased par-
ticipation (see Appendix G). Therefore, ∆qW provides a lower bound of the exact average
deadweight loss: ∆qW ≤ ∆qW .
9In France, since September 2014, public subsidies for home energy retrofits are given only if the job is
completed by a certified contractor. This ”eco-conditionnality” rule is an interesting way of addressing at the
same time moral hazard and other problems, such as technology spillovers or energy-use externalities. Note
however that subsidies are only a second-best solution to energy-use externalities (Giraudet and Quirion
2008).
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The formula is quite intuitive. It weighs the cost of quality against its benefits in terms
of gross energy savings. This corresponds to a net present value calculation that only takes
into account technological information. It does not require knowledge of the utility function
for energy service V (·) nor its specific effect on energy use Es. Therefore, the direct rebound
effect can be ignored. Still, the formula contains the key parameters of the market and
behavioral environment p, l and r.
Marginal welfare effect of a quality standard. The marginal welfare effect of a quality
standard is simply given by Equation 26, enhanced with −M ′ on the right-hand side. Com-
putation of this formula requires knowing the technology Eq, the production cost C(·), and
the cost of random post-implementation audits M(·).
Marginal welfare effect of energy-savings insurance. The marginal effect of incremen-
tal insurance coverage k to the parties willing to engage in the contract is given by Equation
40 (Appendix D). It can be rewritten as follows:
(27) dWdk = pΓ
(
sEsη
s
k − qEqηq1−k
)
The η terms are the elasticities of each parties’ input to the insurance coverage. The
elasticy of the rebound effect to insurance completeness, ηsk, is positive. The elasticity of
quality to insurance incompleteness, ηq1−k, is negative. 10 These elasticities are the key effects
an econometrician would need to measure to evaluate the policy.
Again, computation of the formula requires knowing the technology, namely the average
marginal effects of inputs on energy use qEq and sEs. But interestingly, unlike the standard,
the evaluator does not need to have information about cost C(·).
4. Moral hazard problems in building weatherization: Background
Home weatherization technologies involve a significant installation input. If completed poorly
by professionals, installation can be the source of many defects. This includes, for instance,
an improper connection of ducts in heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) sys-
tems, an imperfect filling of wall cavities before insulation installation or infiltrations around
windowpanes. Such defects can typically not be detected at zero cost. A consumer has to
10With isoelastic functions, we have ηq1−k = −ηqk.
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hire an expert to perform a blower door test or thermographic screening. Even if the con-
sumer had the expertise to monitor the contractor completing the installation, doing it would
incur some opportunity cost of time. Lastly, the defects may not manifest immediately but
sometimes months or years after job completion.
While the problem is general to the building sector, it has specific implications when it
comes to energy use. The building sector is believed to have the largest and most cost-
effective potential for energy savings and carbon dioxide emissions reduction (Levine, U¨rge-
Vorsatz, Blok, Geng, Harvey, Lang, Levermore, Mongameli Mehlwana, Mirasgedis, Novikova,
Rilling, and Yoshino 2007). Weatherization measures account for the bulk of this potential.
According to a widely publicized although controversial11 study by McKinsey & Co. (2009),
improvements of building shells and HVAC systems could save 3 quadrillion end-use BTUs
in the U.S. by 2020. Two-third of this amount would be achieved in existing homes. Yet this
technical potential could remain partly untapped if moral hazard problems are important in
the sector.
In this section, we discuss empirical evidence of the effects modeled in the previous section.
4.1. Rebound effects
Two sources of rebound effect were discussed in the model. A first source is the consumer’s
increased use of energy service after energy efficiency investment. Technically, this corre-
sponds to the increasing slope of the consumer’s reaction function. This type of rebound
effect is well established in the literature. Hirst, White, and Goeltz (1985) provide early ev-
idence from a retrofit program that households increased their indoor temperature settings
after investment by almost 1◦F on average. More recently, a meta-review on the rebound
effect by Sorrell, Dimitropoulos, and Sommerville (2009) suggests that 10 to 30% of energy
savings in space heating use are taken back after retrofit through increased comfort. Over-
all, backfire rebound effects seem to be unlikely (Gillingham, Kotchen, Rapson, and Wagner
2013; Borenstein 2013).
The other source of rebound effect in our model is induced by energy-savings insurance.
Unlike the previous one, this one is a source of moral hazard. Technically, it corresponds to an
upward shift of the consumer’s reaction function. We are not aware of any estimation of the
elasticity of the rebound effect to insurance coverage (i.e., ηsk in Equation 27). Studies that
estimate the effect of including heating bills in rents can nevertheless provide proxies. Using
11See Allcott and Greenstone (2012) for a constructive critique of the study.
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the same dataset from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Residential Energy Consumption
Survey (RECS), Levinson and Niemann (2004) and Gillingham, Harding, and Rapson (2012)
find that consumers who have heating bills included in rents, hence facing zero marginal cost
for energy use, do use their heating system more intensively than those who bear the full
cost.12
4.2. Defective quality
Empirical challenges. A consistent finding in the assessment of building energy retrofits is
the discrepancy between predicted and realized energy savings (Metcalf and Hassett 1999).
This has come to be known as the energy performance gap in the engineering literature
(de Wilde 2014). For instance, in her assessment of Energy Upgrade California Home
Retrofits, Brown (2012) finds predicted savings that exceed realized ones by a half. Sev-
eral causes are usually put forward to explain that gap: uncertainty in building simulation
(due to the complexity of ex ante building systems and the error associated with ex post
measurement), which is usually assessed through sensitivity analysis of simulation models;
occupancy effects; and defective quality. Compared to the other two problems, evidence of
the latter is much more scarce and mostly anecdotal. For instance, as of 2008, only 15% of
central air conditioning installations in existing dwellings were reported to meet satisfactory
quality specifications in California (Messenger 2008). The impact of quality defects on en-
ergy use is even less known than their occurrence. Brown (2012) cites evidence that a 5%
gap in insulation coverage can reduce the insulation effectiveness by 30%.
How can quality defects be properly identified? The ideal experiment would have exoge-
nous variation in the level of observability of a particular type of retrofit and would allow one
to compare the quality after retrofit for projects with low and high levels of observability.
The change in quality induced by the exogenous variation in observability could then be
attributed to moral hazard on the contractor’s side. In this context, what would qualify
as a valid exogenous variation in observability? Consider an intervention where a regulator
implements random post-retrofit audits with and without announcing the audit in advance
to the contractor and the homeowner. A simple prediction of our theory is that contractors
will offer a better quality if they know that their work will be assessed after completion. The
presence or absence of audit pre-announcement would thus introduce the variation required
to test the presence of moral hazard.
12This is identified along two margins: the level of thermostat settings and the changes in thermostat
settings. Interestingly, both studies find the latter margin to be more important.
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Although several programs have generously subsidized pre-treatment energy audits, very
few have considered post-treatment audits. To our knowledge, the data required to provide
causal evidence of the existence of moral hazard in the retrofit market are thus nonexistent.
Suggestive evidence from France. Here we present summary statistics from a building
audit program implemented in France to gain insight into the frequency and importance of
the quality defects associated with energy saving technologies.
In 1978, France established the Decennial Liability, a mandatory insurance subscribed
by building contractors to cover structural defects that may occur up to ten years after the
construction of a building. The Agence Qualite´ Construction (AQC) was created by the
French government to implement the legislation.
In 2010, the AQC set up a database, REX, focusing on thermal defects.13 The REX
database contains detailed information on defects in construction and renovation projects.
Each project documented in REX is the outcome of a three-step audit conducted by an
expert hired by the AQC. The first step consists of an interview with one or two project
stakeholders. It is then followed by an on-site visit where the structural features of the
building and energy-related technologies are carefully inspected. Finally, the expert assigned
to a particular project shares his or her findings with other AQC experts, who may provide
feedback.
Only buildings that met France’s ’low-energy’ requirements were considered under REX.
These low-energy requirements cap the annual primary energy use of a building at 50 kWh
per square meter. Since 2012, it is the building code standard for new constructions. From
the pool of buildings that met these requirements, the AQC randomly selected more than
500 projects for an audit. The selection process was stratified by region, building end-use
(single-family dwellings, multi-family dwellings and commercial buildings), type of project
(construction and renovation), and the presence or absence of a label of performance.
For each building, defects were identified during the on-site visits, which occurred either
during the project or up to two years after completion. The defects were characterized along
several dimensions: severity, origin, nature. Severity was classified in three categories: minor,
intermediate or major. Major defects are those for which an insurance claim was made. The
other two levels are qualified to the discretion of the expert. No further information is
provided as to how severity levels specifically impact the energy use of the building. Origin
13Prior to REX, data on thermal defects were not collected by the AQC as the Decennial Liability only
covers structural defects.
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refers to any part of the building the defect originated from. Even though experts have a
specific training for recording thermal defects, they are able to and have to report any type
of defect. We summarize origin into two categories: thermal (insulation, heating, hot water,
ventilation) and structural (all other). Lastly, the nature of a defect refers to the stage of
the project to which the failure was attributed. We summarize this information into four
categories: design stage, execution stage, operation stage, and other.
As of March, 2015, the REX database contains detailed information on 2,712 defects
collected on 554 audits. 19 audits had some information missing. We thus focus on 546
audits and 2,762 defects for which all the information was available. From this sample,
57% of the projects were new constructions and 43% were renovations of existing buildings.
The buildings examined are evenly distributed across end-uses: commercial buildings (37%),
single-family dwellings (34%) and multi-family dwellings (29%). From the 546 projects
audited, only 81 have no defect. The median number of defect per building is 4. On average,
each building experiences 5.1 defects of any type (standard deviation 4.9). Severity is minor
in 70% of the cases, intermediate in 26% of the cases and major in 4% of the cases. Defects
are mostly due to failures at the execution (37%) and operation stages (35%). Overall,
thermal defects account for 43% of all defects. As Figure 1 shows, the severity and nature
of defects in this category of origin is very similar to that of the full sample. Moreover, as
Table 1 shows, the problem affects indistinctly all type of buildings.
Two important conclusions can be drawn. First, implementation of energy saving tech-
nologies is in most case imperfect. Virtually all projects, despite being selected to meet
high performance requirements, experience at least several minor defects and one out of five
experiences a major defect. Second, the defects mostly occur during and after the treatment.
That is, at a stage of the project where the level of effort and due-diligence of a contrac-
tor ought to play an important role. It is thus likely that moral hazard contributes to the
manifestation of quality defects in buildings.
5. A numerical illustration based on the US insulation market
We now go back to the model to illustrate the welfare implications of moral hazard problems
and the relative advantages of policy instruments. We focus on natural gas use for space
heating and investments in wall insulation in U.S. homes.
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5.1. Functional forms used in the simulations
The homeowner sets temperature s, measured in Fahrenheit (◦F), above a minimum comfort
level smin. The value V (·) that she derives from this energy service is bounded above by
Vmax, which corresponds to a maximum budget dedicated to space heating. The function is
increasing and concave, and takes the following form:
(28) V (s) ≡ Vmax
(
1− e−α(s−smin)
)
with smin ≤ s ≤ smax,
where α > 0 is a calibrated parameter.
The use of natural gas E0, measured in thousand cubic feet of natural gas (MCF), increases
with indoor temperature (at an increasing rate) with a constant calibrated elasticity γ > 1:
(29) E0(s) ≡ β(s− smin)γ with smin ≤ s ≤ smax,
where parameter β > 0 is calibrated so as to convert Fahrenheit degrees into thousand cubic
feet.
Investment in wall insulation of efficiency G(q) lowers energy use as follows:
(30) E(s, q) ≡ (1−G(q))E0(s).
Efficiency is increasing in the quality q offered by the contractor (at a decreasing rate),
within two limits 0 < Gmin < Gmax < 1:
(31) G(q) ≡ Gmin + (Gmax −Gmin)
(
1− e−ω(q−qmin)
)
with qmin ≤ q ≤ qmax,
where ω > 0 is a calibrated parameter.
The contractor bears a fixed cost K, which corresponds to a minimum labor input qmin.
As the contractor provides the homeowner with a higher quality, he needs to have installers
work longer and mobilize higher skills, which results in higher wages. As a result, cost
increases quadratically in the number of worker.hours q:
(32) C(q) ≡ K + ρ(q − qmin) + φ2 (q − qmin)
2 with qmin ≤ q ≤ qmax,
where ρ > 0 and φ > 0 are calibrated parameters.
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5.2. Data and calibration
Homeowners’ characteristics are drawn from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Residential
Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) of 2009. We use information on indoor temperature,
energy use, energy expenditure and income contained in the online database. We first
extract a preliminary sample of 4,306 U.S. households who own and occupy their house
and pay for natural gas for space heating. We then remove households who declare a winter
daytime temperature below 60◦F or above 80◦F and thereby obtain a working sample of
4,266 households. This sample covers 35% of the complete dataset. Summary statistics are
provided in Table 2.
In the reference scenario, we ignore potential behavioral anomalies and assume that home-
owners discount future energy expenditures at a normal rate of 7%. They do it over the
complete lifetime of an insulation project (35 years), thus assuming full capitalization of
energy savings. To keep consistency with data, we use the price of natural gas derived from
the RECS sample ($11.14/MCF), assuming away potential distortions in this market (Davis
and Muehlegger 2010). All of these assumptions are subsequently relaxed in the sensitivity
analysis. We consider environmental damages caused by carbon dioxide emissions associated
with natural gas use and value them at $33/tCO2.
Fewer data are available to parameterize the supply side of the insulation market. We use
estimates from the engineering literature and informal discussions with practitioners. Our
assumptions are detailed in Table 3.
In the RECS sample, the annual fraction of homeowners investing in insulation is 3.4%.14
Our model is calibrated so that this rate is replicated in the private optimum and can
be doubled at best. That is, participation among potential investors is set to 50% in the
private optimum. A participation of 100% in the model can thus be interpreted as an annual
insulation rate of 6.8% in the total population.
The calibration procedure leads to net non-energy benefits of $2,035. This means that
attributes such as aesthetics or acoustic comfort yield benefits that exceed the hassle factor
associated with insulation. Moreover, net non-energy benefits are necessary to induce the
median homeowner to invest in insulation. All calibration targets are outlined in Table 4
and the calibration procedure is detailed in Appendix F.
146.8% of the population declare having insulation installed in the last two years (variable AGEINS=1).
Note that the 3.4% rate is close to 2.9%, which would be the annual rate if investment occurred once every
35 years.
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The temperature distribution found in the RECS sample is fitted with a log-normal dis-
tribution of homeowners’ types with parameters µ = 0 and σ = 1. Yet we do not intend
to reproduce such a large heterogeneity, which may be partly driven by variables omitted in
our model. Therefore, in the reference scenario, we assume a narrower distribution of home-
owners’ types with log-normal parameters µ = 0 and σ = 0.25, from the 0.5th percentile
(θ = 0.53) to the 99.5th percentile (θ = 1.90). The model fit is illustrated in Figure 2.
With these structural and numerical assumptions, the homeowner of type θ = 1 is both
the median of the distribution and the marginal participant in the private optimum. The
model satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of private
and social equilibria (Proposition 1).
5.3. Quantification of the energy efficiency gap
Simulation results are illustrated in the figures and detailed in Table 5 for the median home-
owner and Table 6 for the population average. In Figure 4, various equilibria are mapped
in the framework proposed by Jaffe and Stavins15 (1994), so as to visualize the trade-offs
between economic efficiency and energy efficiency. Without internalization of energy-use ex-
ternalities, the private optimum generates modest improvements in either welfare or energy
efficiency, compared to the equilibrium before investment. In contrast, when the contractor
cooperates to undo the moral hazard, both welfare and energy efficiency improvements be-
come substantial. Average quality moves from 24 to 47 worker.hours (roughly a one workday
gap), thus moving average energy efficiency from 3% to 27%. As a consequence, the average
cost of quality increases from $2,400 to $2,830.16 Lifetime discounted welfare net of environ-
mental damages increases by $1,723 (or $1,249 if environmental damages are not accounted
for). This number is several times larger than the cost of a home energy audit, estimated
to be $347 on average (Palmer, Walls, Gordon, and Gerarden 2013). Therefore, government
intervention intended to undo the moral hazard could be welfare improving.17.
15The authors have refined their conceptual diagram over the years. The version we specifically refer to
first appeared in Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins (2004).
16If the supply side could perfectly price discriminate, the cost of quality would be equal to the sum of
the zero-profit price and the homeowner’s net present value. For the median homeowner, the cost of quality
would be $4,102, instead of $2,830 under perfect competition.
17Undoing the moral hazard saves 0.4 tCO2 annually. If home energy audits were sufficient to solve the
moral hazard problem and achieve these savings, the lifetime discounted carbon dioxide cost-effectiveness of
the instrument would be $44/tCO2.
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Further improvements along both the energy efficiency and welfare dimensions can occur if
environmental damages are internalized through a carbon price. In Jaffe and Stavins’ words,
the social optimum is then moved from the ”Narrow economists’ optimum” to the ”True social
optimum”. The average welfare gains from undoing the moral hazard ($1,723) are one order
of magnitude larger than those from internalizing energy-use externalities ($162). This result
is quite general and does not necessitate sophisticated modeling. It reflects the difference
between the marginal inefficiency due to moral hazard, namely the unit of energy that could
have been cut by optimal investment (valued at energy price p = $11.14/MCF), and the
social cost of environmental damages (valued at pCO2 = $33/tCO2 = $1.69/MCF). Recall
that here we assume away potential distortions in the price of natural gas, an assumption
we then relax in sensitivity analysis.
The higher welfare level in the true social optimum is not general to the model, but due
to the absence of backfire rebound effects in our calibration (see Proposition 4(iii)). Indeed,
as reported in Table 4, the ”investment” rebound effect is 31% in the private optimum and
34% in the social optimum. In addition, we find a ”relative” rebound effect of 33%, meaning
that 33% of energy efficiency gains are taken back when the economy moves from the private
to the social optimum. These numbers are in the upper range of the estimates reported by
Sorrell, Dimitropoulos, and Sommerville (2009) for space heating.
The moral hazard market failure can be restated as an average implied discount rate of
20%. This value is computed by solving and averaging the discount rate corresponding to
each θ that matches the quality found in the social optimum with the net present value found
in the private optimum, discounted at 7% by assumption.
Figure 3 illustrates, with the median homeowner, how equilibria are formed through
reaction function intersections. The reaction functions are mildly upward sloping. The
consumer’s energy service varies by no more than 2 Degrees Fahrenheit with the quality
of installation. Such a sensitivity is consistent with the values found in the literature (e.g.,
Hirst, White, and Goeltz (1985)). While the quality offered by the contractor is always at the
minimum if he behaves non-cooperatively, it mildly increases with consumer’s energy service
if he behaves cooperatively. As predicted by Proposition 2, the social optimum implements
both a higher quality and a higher energy service than the private optimum. The figure also
pictures some comparative statics of the energy price. Pricing energy-use externalities shifts
the consumer’s reaction function inward and the contractor’s upward (c.f., Equations 36 and
37). As discussed in Appendix C, the final location of the equilibrium – at a higher quality
and a lower energy service – is not general but specific to model parameters.
26
5.4. Comparison of policy instruments
To isolate the ability of minimum quality standards and energy-savings insurance to specifi-
cally address moral hazard problems, we focus here on their welfare effects gross of environ-
mental damages. More detailed results can be found in Tables 5 and 6.
If homeowner types were perfectly observable, the government would implement stan-
dards corresponding to each homeowner’s optimal quality. Moreover, insuring contractors
could design optimal contracts for every homeowner (Figure 7). On average, such contracts
stipulate a coverage of 33% and close the energy efficiency gap by 77% along the welfare
dimension. As illustrated in Figure 5, insurance shifts the reaction functions toward higher
parties’ actions (c.f. Equations 19 and 20). For the median homeowner, the resulting equi-
librium entails a quality level that is intermediate between the social and private one and
an energy service that is higher than in the social optimum. This positioning is contingent
upon our calibration, not general to the model. Under full insurance, the contractor offers
the socially optimal quality, but the marginal energy costs are zero. The homeowner thus
consumes her maximum amount of energy service (smax).
In practice, homeowners’ types are unobservable. The insuring contractor cannot offer
each homeowner her optimal contract, just like the government cannot implement as many
standards as there are homeowner types. Rather, they both implement uniform instruments.
The optimal minimum quality standard is given by Equation 22. Let us assume first
that monitoring a standard is costless. Increasing its stringency from 24 to 47 worker.hours
increases both economic efficiency and energy efficiency (Figure 8). Further tightening in-
creases energy efficiency but not economic efficiency: The standard becomes too stringent
for most of the people. The optimal standard is very close to the quality that is optimal
to the median homeowner (47.1 worker.hours). As shown in Figure 6, such a standard is
too tight to the 5th percentile homeowner (type θ = 0.66), who would have been better-off
with a standard of 45.6 worker.hours. It is too loose to the 95th percentile homeowner (type
θ = 1.51), who would have been better-off with a standard of 48.4 hours. Therefore, there
is a narrow quality range in which the standard can be set so that average welfare is very
close to the social optimum.
A similar pattern is observed with uniform insurance. Increasing insurance coverage up to
30% increases both energy efficiency and economic efficiency (Figure 8). Between 30% and
40%, the optimal uniform insurance contract is very close to the situation where consumers
are all offered their optimal contract. Again, welfare losses due to heterogeneity are negligible.
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Energy efficiency then increases at the expense of economic efficiency up to a coverage of
60%, a situation discussed by Jaffe and Stavins as a ”Technologist’s optimum”. Beyond that
point, energy efficiency starts decreasing too, until the curve hits the horizontal axis, for a
coverage of k = 100%, at the welfare level enjoyed before investment. That is, under full
insurance, the total cost paid to the contractor is so high that no homeowner can be left
with a positive net present value, hence none invests. Otherwise, indoor temperature would
be set at corner smax = 80◦F, leading to an annual natural gas use of 79 MCF. This would
imply a prohibitive lifetime discounted energy bill of $11,442, fully borne by the contractor
and passed on to the homeowner as an insurance premium.
Overall, we find that the average welfare gain under the optimal standard is $290 greater
than the gain obtained with optimal insurance (and $720 higher if environmental damages
are accounted for). Unlike insurance, a standard entails monitoring costs, estimated for each
realization at $347 from Palmer, Walls, Gordon, and Gerarden (2013). In practice, only a
fraction of realizations can be randomly monitored, so this estimate is an upper bound of the
true monitoring cost. When accounting for monitoring costs, the welfare difference between
the standard and insurance becomes ambiguous. However, our assumption of insurance
contracts running over 35 years certainly overestimates the welfare gains from insurance.
Therefore, the superiority of minimum quality standards over energy-savings insurance seems
to be a robust result.
6. Discussion
6.1. Sensitivity analysis
We first examine the sensitivity of the model to market barrier parameters: a larger hetero-
geneity in homeowners’ valuations, a lower initial insulation rate, higher insulation costs and
a higher absolute valuation of energy service (Table 7, Figure 9). We find that compared to
the reference scenario, absolute welfare levels vary by a large magnitude, but the deadweight
loss from moral hazard is relatively stable [$1,085-1,260]. Moving from the private optimum
to the social optimum increases welfare by 3-5%. Implied discount rates amount to 17-20%.
We then introduce market failures and behavioral anomalies, the comparative statics of
which is formalized in Appendix C (Table 8, Figure 9). We model non-capitalization of
energy savings by setting investment lifetime to 10 years, the typical period of residency in a
dwelling. We also model undistorted natural gas price by removing the 49.7% markup above
marginal cost estimated by Davis and Muehlegger (2010); the price is then $5.80/MCF.
28
Lastly, we model undervaluation of energy savings with a 20% discount rate. Compared to
the reference scenario, introducing non-capitalization and undervaluation of energy savings
decreases the absolute welfare level and increases the implied discount rate. Removing energy
price distortions increases absolute welfare and lowers the implied discount rate. In addition,
unlike market barriers, these alternative assumptions significantly reduce the deadweight loss
from moral hazard, which amounts to $289-517 in absolute terms and 1-3% in relative terms.
If homeowners undervalue energy savings (r = 20%) and ignore environmental damages,
then they might not perceive optimal quality as beneficial: the welfare gains ($289) are
below the upper bound of the monitoring cost ($347). This does not mean, however, that
public intervention is not warranted. The situation with undistorted price of natural gas
(p = $5.80) is the closest to a market where no inefficiency other than moral hazard and
carbon dioxide emission externalities occurs. In this most relevant context, the deadweight
loss from moral hazard ($486, or $912 if environmental damages are accounted for) is still
above the monitoring cost, though by a smaller margin than in our reference scenario. This
strengthens the case for government intervention aimed at undoing the moral hazard.
Overall, the results of the sensitivity analysis suggest that the magnitude of the deadweight
loss varies considerably with the investment lifetime, the energy price and the discount rate,
but varies less with the parameters capturing market barriers.
6.2. Approximation of the deadweight loss
The net present value calculation, ∆qW , which we proposed as a sufficient statistic of dead-
weight loss (cf. Equation 25), contains all the market and behavioural parameters p, r and
l which were found most important in the sensitivity analysis. Moreover, Tables 7 and 8
(fourth row) show that it never underestimates the exact deadweight loss by more than 9% in
absolute value across scenarios. This underlines the importance of having accurate estimates
of the technology and its cost for future empirical research.
We now extrapolate our reference scenario to the U.S. population. Recall that the home-
owners using natural gas for space heating covered 35% of the RECS dataset. Moreover, we
confined our attention to 3.4% of that subpopulation (hence 1.2% of the complete dataset),
the fraction of households investing in insulation annually. Applying these shares to a num-
ber of U.S. households of 115 million (U.S. Census Bureau value for 2008-2012), our analysis
covered approximately 1.4 million households. On average, the moral hazard associated
with insulation represents for each household a quality shortfall of one workday, a natural
gas overuse of 8 MCF, 0.4 tons of CO2 emissions and $1,723 of present value deadweight loss
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(net of environmental damages). At the population scale, undoing moral hazard could thus
save 11 billion cubic feet of natural gas and 0.6 million tons of CO2 annually, equivalent to
$2.4 billion present value benefits.
6.3. Extensions
Considering risk-aversion would be a natural extension of the model. As a matter of fact, the
performance of energy efficiency technologies depends on volatile factors, such as weather
conditions or energy prices, to which consumers are likely to be adverse. Moreover, the
home retrofit industry is made up of small industries that have little room to diversify
risks (Lutzenhiser, 1994). In our model, risk-averse homeowners would expect higher energy
expenditures than a certainty equivalent, hence demand less energy service. Risk-averse
firms would respond with a lower quality in the social optimum. Overall, the introduction
of risk-aversion on both sides of the market would reduce the size of the energy efficiency
gap compared to a riskless situation.
Instead of assuming homogeneous firms that all fail to offer quality in equilibrium, we
could assume heterogeneous firms. Within our informational structure, a fringe of firms may
adopt reputation or signaling strategies and supply a better, or even optimal quality. Such
private forces would reduce the size of the energy efficiency gap.
7. Conclusion
We examined how moral hazard problems can generate an energy efficiency gap, and how
this information asymmetry may interact with other market failures. Taking home energy
retrofits as an example, we show that if the quality of installation offered by a retrofit
contractor is unobserved by the homeowner, then the contractor will cut it in equilibrium.
This leads to a suboptimal level of energy efficiency along both the intensive and extensive
margins: Actual quality underperforms engineering predictions and some consumers are
discouraged from investing.
Numerical simulations calibrated to the U.S. home insulation market suggest that the
potential welfare gains from undoing moral hazard are larger than the cost of quality audits.
This holds for a large range of market environments, most notably when moral hazard is the
only market failure in place. Therefore, undoing moral hazard is welfare-improving. The
moral hazard problem induces an energy efficiency gap that is substantially larger than the
one induced by energy-use externalities. We analytically establish and numerically illustrate
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that the deadweight loss associated with moral hazard can be closely approximated using
only technological data. Extrapolating our results to the U.S. population of homeowners
using natural gas for space heating, we find that increasing the quality of each insulation
installation by one workday could save 11 billion cubic feet and 0.6 million tons of CO2 each
year, equivalent to $2.4 billion present value benefits.
Our analysis provides motivation for energy efficiency policies that would go beyond the
internalization of energy-use externalities. This recommendation holds as long as consumers
are not prone to a backfire rebound effect – a reasonable hypothesis (Sorrell 2009; Gilling-
ham, Kotchen, Rapson, and Wagner 2013; Borenstein 2013). When addressing the moral
hazard, the first-best outcome can only be attained to the extent that energy performance
and consumer preferences can be made perfectly observable. Since no technology can meet
that goal at an affordable cost yet, government intervention will only generate second-best
outcomes: Minimum quality standards neglect consumer heterogeneity and incur some mon-
itoring costs, while energy-savings insurance raise a second moral hazard. However, our
numerical results suggest that the former can bring social welfare very close to its optimal
level. Similarly, even with modest coverage, insurance contracts can deliver welfare gains
that are economically important.
This insight is relatively new. While most investigations of the energy efficiency gap have
focused on the role of possible undervaluation of energy savings by consumers (Gillingham,
Newell, and Palmer 2009; Allcott and Greenstone 2012), ours underlines the importance
of considering the behavior of the firms supplying energy efficiency. Moral hazard offers a
simple explanation for the systematic overestimation of energy savings by engineering models
and for the abnormally high discount rates rationalizing consumers’ behavior. In practice,
we provided suggestive evidence from France that defective quality is an issue in the building
sector. Whether such defects result from contractors exploiting an informational rent now
needs to be carefully identified empirically.
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Appendix A. Comparative statics with respect to consumer type θ
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to Equation 6:
(33) ∀t ds
∗
θ
dθ =
−V ′
θV ′′ − pEss > 0
Therefore, for any given quality q offered by the contractor, a higher valuation of energy
service shifts the consumer’s reaction function upward:
(34) ∀q, ∀θ1 > θ2 s∗θ1(q) > s∗θ2(q)
As long as condition (11) is satisfied, new equilibria are determined with the properties
below:
Proposition 5. If condition (11) is satisfied for two participating consumers of types θh and
θl, with θh > θl, then the higher θ implies higher actions by either contracting party, in either
equilibrium:
(i) qncθh = q
nc
θl
= qmin
(ii) sncθh ≥ sncθl
(iii) scθh ≥ scθl
(iv) qcθh ≥ qcθl.
proof: (i) is straightforward. (ii) Combined with (34), it implies: sncθh = s
∗
θh
(qncθh ) ≥
s∗θl(q
nc
θl
) = sncθl . (iii) Likewise, (34) implies, for all s, s
∗
θh
(q∗(s)) ≥ s∗θl(q∗(s)). In particular,
scθh = s
∗
θh
(q∗(scθh)) ≥ s∗θl(q∗(scθh)). From (11), s∗θl(q∗(·)) is increasing with slope lower than 1.
Any point that is greater than its image by s∗θl(q
∗(·)) is thus greater than the fixed point of
s∗θl(q
∗(·)): ∀a > scθl , s∗θl(q∗(a))− s∗θl(q∗(scθl)) < a− scθl ⇔ s∗θl(q∗(a)) < a. Therefore, scθh ≥ scθl .
(iv) Lastly, since g∗(·) is increasing, qcθh = g∗(scθh) ≥ g∗(scθl) = qcθl .
Appendix B. Participation to investment
For any equilibrium situation j, participation will depend on the limits of the net present
value function, the sign of which is indeterminate:
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(35) NPV j(θ) ≡
[
θ
(
V (sjθ)− V (s0θ)
)
− p
(
E(sjθ, q
j
θ)− E0(s0θ)
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
Γ−T + ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
The right inequality is given by Assumption 1(v). The left inequality comes from the
following inequalities: θV (s0θ) − pE0(s0θ) ≤ θV (s0θ) − pE(s0θ, qjθ) ≤ θV (sjθ) − pE(sjθ, qjθ). The
former is due to technological assumptions about E and E0 and the latter is due to sjθ
maximizing U .
According to Proposition 5, equilibrium actions sjθ and q
j
θ decrease with θ. As they are
bounded below by smin and qmin, the limit of NPV (θ) when θ tends toward zero is finite.
If lim
θ→0
NPV (θ) ≥ 0 then all consumers participate. Participation is given by N j ≡∫+∞
0 dF (θ) = 1.
If lim
θ→0
NPV (θ) < 0 and lim
θ→+∞
NPV (θ) > 0 then by Equation 12, there exists a unique
cutoff type θ0, as discussed in the text.
If lim
θ→0
NPV (θ) < 0 and lim
θ→+∞
NPV (θ) ≤ 0 then participation is nil. In this case, the
gross utility gains accruing to the homeowner never offset the increase in the payment to the
contractor.
Appendix C. Comparative statics with respect to market and be-
havioral features
Recall that ζ ≡ pΓ(r, l). A higher ζ is equivalent to a higher energy price p or a higher Γ,
that is, a lower discount rate r or a longer lifetime l.
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to Equations 6 and 7, we see that an increase
in ζ shifts reaction functions s∗θ(·) downward and q∗(·) upward:
(36) ∀t ds
∗
θ
dζ =
Es
θV ′′/ζ − Ess < 0
(37) dq
∗
dζ =
−Eq
C ′′/ζ + Eqq
> 0
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By the same reasoning as in Proposition 5, a higher ζ entails a higher energy service in
private equilibrium. But optimal actions cannot be compared unambiguously in the private
and social equilibria.
The influence of ζ on NPV ∗, established by the Envelope Theorem, depends on the
consumer’s reaction to higher energy efficiency:
(38) dNPV
∗
dζ = −
[
E(s∗θ, q∗θ)− E0(s0θ)
]
As long as energy efficiency investments decrease energy use for all consumers, the net
present value is increasing in ζ. By the same type of reasoning as in Proposition 5, this
leads to a higher participation and a higher average welfare. This conclusion is reversed if all
consumers are subject to an investment backfire rebound effect, i.e., ∀θ E(s∗θ, q∗θ) > E0(s0θ).
In this case, a higher ζ decreases participation and average welfare.
Appendix D. Optimal policies
Optimal insurance coverage. The first-order condition for finding the optimal insurance
contract from Equation 21 is:
(39) pΓ
(
ds∗∗θ
dk [θV
′ − pEs]− dq
∗∗
dk
[
C ′
Γ + pEq
])
= 0
Plugging in Equations 17 and 18 and further rearranging gives the equation that solves
the optimal coverage kˆ:
(40) ∀t pΓ
(
kEs
ds∗∗θ
dk + (1− k)Eq
dq∗∗
dk
)
= 0
Optimal minimum quality standard. Assuming that the cutoff type exists and is unique,
the constraint in Equation 22 is binding. The optimization program can be solved by simply
maximizing the objective function and assuming that θ0 is an implicit function θ0(q¯) defined
by the constraint. Applying the Leibniz integral rule and the Envelope Theorem leads to
the following first-order condition for maximization:
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(41)
dθ0
dq¯
(
U0(θ0(q¯), s0θ)− U(θ0(q¯), s∗θ(q¯), q¯) +M(q¯)
)
+
∫ +∞
θ0(q¯)
[
∂U(θ, s∗θ(q¯), q¯)
∂q¯
−M ′
]
dF (θ) = 0
Recognizing that U0(θ0(q¯), s0θ)−U(θ0(q¯), s∗θ(q¯), q¯) = −NPV (θ0(q¯), s∗θ0(q¯), q¯) and using the
binding constraint leads to the result (Equation 23). In fact, since marginal participants are
indifferent between investing and not investing, marginal changes in participation can be
neglected.
Note that if participation to investment is nil without the standard, no standard will be
welfare-improving. In contrast, if participation is full without the standard, the constraint
will not be binding and the optimal standard will be defined by the following first-order
condition:
(42)
∫ +∞
0
[
∂U(θ, s∗θ(q¯), q¯)
∂q¯
−M ′
]
dF (θ) = 0
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 4
We illustrate with energy-use externalities (px > 0).
(i) For all θ, since (sc,xθ , q
c,x
θ ) maximizes Ux in the social setting, Ux(θ, s
c,x
θ , q
c,x
θ ) ≥ Ux(θ, s, q)
for all (s, q), and for (snc,xθ , q
nc,x
θ ) in particular. Likewise, we have U0x(θ, s
0,x
θ ) ≥ U0x(θ, s0θ). By
Proposition 3, it follows that W c,xx ≥ W nc,xx .
(ii) Again, for all θ, since (sc,xθ , q
c,x
θ ) maximizes Ux in the social setting, Ux(θ, s
c,x
θ , q
c,x
θ ) ≥
Ux(θ, scθ, qcθ). In addition, we have NPVx(θ) = NPV (θ) − pxΓx[E(s, q) − E0(s)]. Assume
θx0 is the cutoff type in an equilibrium where both energy-use externalities and moral haz-
ard are addressed, while θ0 is the cut-off type in an equilibrium where only moral hazard
problems are addressed. We have NPVx(θx0) = 0 = NPV (θ0). In the absence of an in-
vestment backfire rebound effect, we thus have NPVx(θx0) = 0 ≤ NPVx(θ0). Since NPV
is increasing in θ, θx0 ≤ θ0, that is, participation is higher if externalities are internalized.
The difference in aggregate welfare between the two equilibria is ∆W =
∫ θx0
0 ∆U0xdF (θ) +∫ θ0
θx0
[Ux(θ, sxθ , qxθ ) − U0x(θ, s0)]dF (θ) +
∫+∞
θ0 ∆UxdF (θ). The first and third integrands of the
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right-hand side are positive (see proof (i) just above). The second integrand is also posi-
tive, since ∀θ ≥ θx0 Ux(θ, sxθ , qxθ ) ≥ U0x(θ, s0x) ≥ U0x(θ, s0). Therefore, aggregate welfare is
larger when externalities are internalized: W c,xx ≥ W cx . The exact same reasoning leads
to W nc,xx ≥ W ncx . This is because since (snc,xθ , qnc,xθ ) maximizes Ux in the private setting,
Ux(θ, snc,xθ , q
nc,x
θ ) is greater than Ux(θ, s, q) for any other actions s and q determined in a
private setting, e.g., (sncθ , qncθ ).
(iii) Assume θc0 (resp. θncc ) is the cutoff type in the social (resp. private) optimum. From
proposition (4i), we have θc0 ≤ θnc0 . Therefore, the aggregate welfare difference between the
two situations is ∆Wx =
∫ θnc0
θc0
NPVx(θ, scθ, qcθ)dF (θ) +
∫+∞
θnc0
[Ux(θ, scθ, qcθ)−Ux(θ, sncθ , qncθ )]dF (θ).
In the absence of an investment backfire rebound effect, the first term of the right-hand side
is positive (see proof (ii) just above). In the absence of a relative backfire rebound effect,
the second term of the right-hand side is also positive. To see this, note that ∀θ E(scθ, qcθ) ≤
E(sncθ , qncθ )⇒ −pxΓxE(scθ, qcθ) ≥ −pxΓxE(sncθ , qncθ ). This, added to U(θ, scθ, qcθ) ≥ U(θ, sncθ , qncθ )
(which is given by definition of the maximum) leads to Ux(θ, scθ, qcθ) ≥ Ux(θ, sncθ , qncθ ). To con-
clude, the aggregate welfare difference is positive: W cx ≥ W ncx .
Appendix F. Model calibration
Parameters α, β and γ (Section 5.1) are computed so as to allow the model to replicate
calibration targets 1, 2 and 3 (Table 4). For θ = 1 and s0 = 69◦F, this leads to:
(43)
V ′(s0)− pE0s (s0) = 0
E0(s0) = 50
dE0(s0θ=1(p))
dp
p
E0(s0θ=1(p))
= −0.4
⇔

Vmaxαexp (−α(s0 − smin))− pγβ(s0 − smin)γ−1 = 0
β(s0 − smin)γ = 50
γ
1−γ−Vmaxα2exp(−α(s0−smin))
pγβ(s0−smin)2
= −0.4
⇔

α = 0.28
β = 5.32
γ = 1.02
Note that if we assume linear technology (γ = 1), then the value of Vmax that solves the
system is $2,719. This provides a lower bound for Vmax, as Vmax is increasing in γ:
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(44) dVmaxdγ =
pβ(s0 − smin)γ−1(1 + γln(s0 − smin))
αexp (−α(s0 − smin)) > 0
Parameter , representing the non-energy benefits of insulation, is computed so as to allow
the model to replicate calibration target 4. As the marginal investing homeowner has type
θ = 1,  is such that NPV (θ = 1, sncθ=1, qncθ=1) = 0, which leads to  = $2, 035.
Parameter ω is computed so as to allow the model to replicate calibration target 5:
(45) G(qmax) = .99Gmax ⇔ Gmin+(Gmax−Gmin)(1−ω(qmax−qmin) = .99Gmax ⇔ ω = .09
Parameters ρ and φ are computed so as to allow the model to replicate calibration targets
6 and 7:
(46)
C
′(qmin) = 15
C ′(qmax) = 30
⇔
ρ = 15ρ+ φ(qmax − qmin) = 30 ⇔
ρ = 15φ = .16
Appendix G. Derivation of the sufficient statistic
For a participating homeowner, the exact deadweight loss ∆qW is:
(47) W c −W nc =
l∑
t=1
[V (sc)− V (snc)− p (E(sc, qc)− E(snc, qnc))] δt − [C(qc)− C(qnc)]
We recognize that:
(48) ∆qW = ∆qW + [V (sc)− V (snc)− p (E(sc, qc)− E(snc, qc))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
Γ
The term in brackets is positive because sc maximizes the function V (·)−E(·, qc). There-
fore, ∆qW ≤ ∆qW .
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42Table 1. Projects and defects in the AQC REX sample
Number of buildings Number of defects
Number of defects, by severity and origin
Minor defects Medium defects Major defects
Structural Thermal Structural Thermal Structural Thermal
Construction projects Multi-family dwellings Labeled 26 96 33 35 13 13 1 1
Non-labeled 55 182 70 66 20 17 6 3
Single-family dwellings Labeled 19 83 23 45 3 10 2 0
Non-labeled 58 221 52 102 12 45 5 5
Commercial buildings Labeled 28 116 46 44 15 8 3 0
Non-labeled 55 336 164 88 48 25 8 3
Renovation projects Multi-family dwellings Labeled 50 245 98 47 39 47 9 5
Non-labeled 23 129 53 27 15 32 2 0
Single-family dwellings Labeled 79 320 75 97 66 63 7 12
Non-labeled 30 167 97 45 10 9 4 2
Commercial buildings Labeled 35 173 78 60 15 16 3 1
Non-labeled 88 694 329 155 127 59 20 4
TOTAL 546 2762 1118 811 383 344 70 36
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of the RECS Sample (n = 4, 266)
RECS
Unit Entry Median Mean SD Min Max
Temperature when
someone is home dur-
ing the day (winter)
◦F TEMPHOME 69.0 69.3 3.4 60.0 80.0
Natural Gas cost for
space heating, 2009
$ DOLNGSPH 562 624 386 33 3,591
Natural Gas usage for
space heating, 2009
MCF BTUNGSPH1.023∗10−3 50.2 55.0 34.0 0.6 337.2
Price paid for natural
gas for space heating
$/MCF DOLNGSPH∗1.023BTUNGSPH∗103 11.14 11.95 5.69 3.75 190.73
Gross household in-
come, 2009
$ MONEYPY 65,000 78,928 50,727 2,500 170,000
Income share dedi-
cated to natural gas
for space heating
DOLNGSPH
MONEYPY 0.82% 1.54% 3.20% 0.02% 65.92%
Notes: ”Natural gas cost for space heating” is measured in thousand BTU in RECS, here converted in MCF.
”Gross household income” is measured with 24 income ranges; we identify each income range with its upper
value and assume an average income of $170,000 for the top category, which is consistent with U.S. Census
Bureau 2009 data for owner-occupiers.
44Table 3. Model parameters
Parameter Symbol Value Unit Source
Minimum indoor tem-
perature
smin 60 ◦F 0.8th percentile of the RECS preliminary sample
Maximum indoor tem-
perature
smax 80 ◦F 99.9th percentile of the RECS preliminary sample
Minimum labour in-
put
qmin 24 worker.hours One workday = 24 worker.hours, e.g., three installers
working 8 hours a day (Best guess)
Maximum labour in-
put
qmax 72 worker.hours Three workdays (Best guess)
Maximum valuation
of energy service
Vmax 2,816 $ The 95th percentile of the income share dedicated to
space heating in the RECS sample is 4.3%. Apply-
ing this fraction to the median income of the sample
($65,000) leads to a maximum budget for space heating
of $2,816.
Minimum energy effi-
ciency of insulation
Gmin 5% (Best guess)
Maximum energy effi-
ciency of insulation
Gmax 30% (Best guess)
Fixed cost of wall in-
sulation
K 2,400 $ (Best guess)
Physical lifetime of in-
sulation investment
l 35 years (Best guess)
Discount rate r 7% Value recommended to assess private investment (U.S.
OMB).
Price of natural gas p 11.14 $/MCF Median price of the RECS sample
Carbon price pCO2 1.69 $/MCF Equivalent to a social cost of carbon of $33/tCO2 in
2010, which is the value recommended for impact anal-
ysis in the U.S. (White House, 2013)
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Table 4. Calibration targets
Calibration target Expression Target value Source
Optimal temperature before in-
vestment to the median home-
owner
s0θ=1 69◦F Median temperature of the RECS
sample
Optimal annual energy use before
investment to the median home-
owner
E0(s0θ=1) 50 MCF Median annual natural gas use for
space heating of the RECS sam-
ple
Price-elasticity of energy demand
before investment to the median
homeowner
See App.G -0.4 Middle value of the [-0.03;-
0.76] range found in the lit-
erature by Gillingham, Newell,
and Palmer (2009) for short-term
price-elasticities of natural gas
use
Participation to insulation invest-
ment in the private optimum
See App.G 50% See text (Section 4.3).
Energy savings at maximum qual-
ity level
G(qmax) 99%Gmax
Wage for insulation workers at
minimum quality level
C ′(qmin) $15/hour According to the U.S. Bureau of
Labour and Statistics, the median
pay for insulation workers was
$16.88/hour in 2010. According
to Zabin, Lester, and Halpern-
Finnerty (2011), the lower range
of insulation wages in California
is $10-15/hour
Wage for insulation workers at
maximum quality level
C ′(qmax) $30/hour Upper range of the values re-
ported by Zabin, Lester, and
Halpern-Finnerty (2011) for Cal-
ifornia
Notes: Parameters α, β, γ, ω, ρ, φ and  (Section 5.1) are calibrated so as to allow the model to replicate these
targets. The procedure is detailed in Appendix F.
46Table 5. Simulation results, median homeowner (θ = 1)
Uninternalized environmental damages Internalized environmental damages
Model output Unit Before
investment
Private op-
timum
Social opti-
mum
Optimal in-
surance
Before
investment
Private op-
timum
Social opti-
mum
Optimal in-
surance
Lifetime discounted welfare,
gross
$ 26,342 26,342 27,613 27,327 26,151 26,160 27,470 27,521
Lifetime discounted welfare,
net of environmental damages
$ 23,384 23,475 25,183 24,446 23,599 23,679 25,345 25,004
Homeowners’ equilibrium tem-
perature
◦F 69.0 69.2 70.1 71.3 67.8 68.0 68.9 70.0
Annual natural gas use for
space heating
MCF 50.0 48.5 41.1 48.7 43.1 42.0 35.9 42.6
Annual natural gas expendi-
ture
$ 557 540 458 543 481 467 400 474
Annual CO2 emissions tCO2 2.6 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.8 2.2
Annual external cost of CO2
emissions
$ 85 82 69 82 73 71 61 72
Contractor’s equilibrium qual-
ity
worker.hour 24.0 47.1 37.9 24.0 49.2 39.2
Energy efficiency of insulation 5% 27% 23% 5% 28% 24%
Rebound effect 39% 34% 89% 45% 39% 94%
Zero-profit insulation price $ 2,400 2,830 2,638 2,400 2,876 2,663
Homeowner’s net present value $ 0 1,271 985 80 1,746 1,370
Wage for insulation workers $/worker/hour 15.00 22.23 19.33 15.00 22.86 19.74
Insurance premium $ 2,317 2,641
Insurance optimal coverage 33% 31%
Notes: Adding ”Zero-profit price of insulation” and ”Homeowner’s net present value” gives the insulation price
that would be charged by a perfectly discriminating monopolist.
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Table 6. Simulation results, averaged over the population of total mass 1
Uninternalized environmental damages Internalized environmental damages
Model output Unit Before
investment
Private op-
timum
Social opti-
mum
Optimal in-
surance
Before
investment
Private op-
timum
Social opti-
mum
Lifetime discounted welfare,
gross
$ 27,488 27,503 28,760 28,474 27,297 27,321 28,617
Lifetime discounted welfare,
net of environmental damages
$ 24,531 24,596 26,330 25,594 24,745 24,814 26,493
Homeowners’ equilibrium tem-
perature
◦F 69.0 69.2 70.1 71.3 67.8 68.0 68.9
Annual natural gas use for
space heating
MCF 50.0 49.1 41.1 48.7 43.1 42.4 35.9
Annual natural gas expendi-
ture
$ 557 547 458 542 481 472 400
Annual CO2 emissions tCO2 2.6 2.5 2.1 2.5 2.2 2.2 1.8
Annual external cost of CO2
emissions
$ 84 83 69 82 73 72 61
Contractor’s equilibrium qual-
ity
worker.hour 24.0 47.1 37.8 24.0 49.1
Energy efficiency of insulation 2.5% 27.0% 23.0% 4.7% 27.5%
Rebound effect 31% 34% 89% 63% 39%
Cutoff type of the marginal
participant
1.00 0.18 0.26 0.67 0.19
Participation rate 50% 100% 100% 94% 100%
Zero-profit insulation price $ 2,400 2,830 2,637 2,400 2,875
Homeowner’s net present value $ 29 1,272 986 86 1,747
Wage for insulation workers $/worker/hour 15.00 22.21 19.32 15.00 22.85
Insurance premium 2,317
Insurance optimal coverage 33%
Notes: ”Energy efficiency” is averaged over the whole population. The average over participants is obtained by
dividing ”Energy Efficiency” by ”Participation rate”. Adding ”Zero profit price of insulation” and ”Homeowner’s
net present value” gives the insulation price that would be charged by a perfectly discriminating monopolist.
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Table 7. Sensitivity to market barrier parameters
Reference Large
homeowner
heterogene-
ity
Low initial
insulation
rate
High cost
of insula-
tion
High valua-
tion of en-
ergy service
σ=1 initial
rate=3.5%
FC=$3000,
C′(qmin)=$20,
C′(qmax)=$50
Vmax=$4000
Implied discount rate 20% 17% 18% 17% 20%
Exact deadweight loss $ 1,258 1,239 1,206 1,085 1,260
Proxy of deadweight loss $ 1,158 1,158 1,158 997 1,158
Appproximation -7.9% -6.5% -3.9% -8.1% -8.1%
Lifetime discounted welfare,
gross
$ Before inv. 27,488 48,901 27,488 27,488 43,100
Private 27,503 48,957 27,489 27,503 43,115
Social 28,760 50,195 28,694 28,587 44,375
Lifetime discounted welfare,
net of environmental damages
$ Before inv. 24,531 45,943 24,531 24,531 40,140
Private 24,596 46,065 24,535 24,596 40,205
Social 26,330 47,776 26,264 26,129 41,940
Annual natural gas use for
space heating
MCF Before inv. 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Private 49.1 48.9 49.9 49.1 49.2
Social 41.1 40.9 41.1 41.6 41.2
Homeowner’s equilibrium tem-
perature
◦F Before inv. 69.0 68.3 69.0 69.0 69.0
Private 69.2 68.5 69.2 69.2 69.1
Social 70.1 69.4 70.1 70.0 69.9
Contractor’s equilibrium qual-
ity
worker.hour Private 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0
Social 47.1 46.9 47.1 43.1 47.1
Energy efficiency of insulation Private 2.5% 2.4% 0.2% 2.5% 2.5%
Social 27.0% 25.7% 27.0% 25.7% 27.0%
Rebound effect Private 31.1% 6.7% 17.0% 31.1% 31.7%
Social 34.0% 29.1% 34.0% 34.3% 34.4%
Cutoff type of the marginal
participant
Private 1.00 1.03 1.58 1.00 1.00
Social 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.15
Participation rate Private 50.0% 48.8% 3.4% 50.0% 50.0%
Social 100.0% 95.7% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Zero-profit insulation price $ Private 2,400 2,400 2,400 3,000 2,400
Social 2,830 2,827 2,830 3,495 2,830
Homeowner’s net present value $ Private 29 114 14 29 29
Social 1,272 1,352 1,206 1,099 1,275
Wage for insulation workers $/worker/hour Private 15.00 15.00 15.00 20.00 15.00
Social 22.21 22.16 22.21 31.92 22.22
Calibrated non-energy benefits $ 2,036 2,032 1,970 2,636 2,036
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Table 8. Sensitivity to market failure and behavioral anomaly parameters
Reference Non-
capitalization
of energy
savings
Undistorted
price of
natural gas
Undervaluation
of energy
savings
l=10 years p=$5.80/MCFr=20%
Implied discount rate 20% 26% 15% 35%
Exact deadweight loss $ 1,258 517 486 289
Proxy of deadweight loss $ 1,158 473 443 263
Appproximation -7.9% -8.6% -9.0% -9.1%
Lifetime discounted welfare,
gross
$ Before inv. 27,488 14,911 32,158 10,597
Private 27,503 14,919 32,165 10,603
Social 28,760 15,436 32,652 10,892
Lifetime discounted welfare,
net of environmental damages
$ Before inv. 24,531 11,954 29,196 7,640
Private 24,596 12,013 29,253 7,696
Social 26,330 12,962 30,165 8,380
Annual natural gas use for
space heating
MCF Before inv. 50.0 50.0 50.1 50.0
Private 49.1 49.1 49.2 49.1
Social 41.1 41.8 42.0 42.5
Homeowner’s equilibrium tem-
perature
◦F Before inv. 69.0 69.0 69.0 69.0
Private 69.2 69.2 69.1 69.2
Social 70.1 70.0 69.7 69.9
Contractor’s equilibrium qual-
ity
worker.hour Private 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0
Social 47.1 41.3 40.9 38.0
Energy efficiency of insulation Private 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5%
Social 27.0% 24.9% 24.7% 23.1%
Rebound effect Private 31.1% 31.1% 32.2% 31.1%
Social 34.0% 34.4% 35.0% 34.8%
Cutoff type of the marginal
participant
Private 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Social 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.28
Participation rate Private 50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 50.0%
Social 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Zero-profit insulation price $ Private 2,400 2,400 2,400 2,400
Social 2,830 2,706 2,698 2,641
Homeowner’s net present value $ Private 29 16 15 11
Social 1,272 525 494 295
Wage for insulation workers $/worker/hour Private 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00
Social 22.21 20.39 20.28 19.38
Calibrated non-energy benefits $ 2,036 2,202 2,210 2,260
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Figure 1. Defects in the AQC REX sample. Overall, 2,762 defects were
observed through 546 audits. They are displayed here by severity, origin and
nature.
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Figure 2. Model fit to RECS sample data. The Gaussian estimator is
the normal distribution of temperature with parameters µ = 69.3 and σ =
3.4, the mean and standard deviation of the RECS sample (Table 2). The
model output is the probability distribution function of s0θ, calculated with the
triangle method and assuming a log-normal distribution of θ with parameters
µ = 0 and σ = 0.25.
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Figure 3. Reaction functions, with a homeowner of median type
θ = 1. (c) refers to the social optimum, (nc) to the private optimum and (c, x)
and (nc, x) to the same optima in the presence of a carbon price of $33/tCO2.
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Figure 4. The energy efficiency gap. The horizontal axis represents av-
erage lifetime discounted welfare, net of environmental damages valued at
$33/tCO2. The vertical axis represents average energy efficiency (with the
value 0% attributed to non-participating homeowners).
.
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Figure 5. Reaction functions under energy-savings insurance, with
a homeowner of median type θ = 1. (c) refers to the social optimum, (nc)
to the private optimum, (i(kˆ)) to the equilibrium induced by insurance with
optimal coverage kˆ and (i(1)) to the full insurance equilibrium.
55
Figure 6. Reaction functions with a minimum quality standard. The
standard is optimal to the median homeowner (θ = 1), but suboptimal to all
others. For instance, it is too tight to the 5th percentile of the homeowners’
distribution (θ = 0.66) and too loose to the 95th percentile (θ = 1.51).
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Figure 7. Net present value and participation with respect to home-
owner’s type θ. The net present value (gross of environmental damages) of
investment in insulation reads on the right vertical axis. The intersection of
each curve with the zero horizontal axis determines the cutoff type θ0 of the
marginal participant in investment. For each cutoff type on the horizontal axis
(from the 0.5th to 95.5th percentile of the θ distribution), participation across
the population is determined by the value of the complementary cumulative
distribution (CCDF) of θ, which reads on the left vertical axis.
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Figure 8. Economic and energy efficiency of policy instruments. The
welfare displayed on the horizontal axis is the average lifetime discounted wel-
fare gross of environmental damages. Each mark of the uniform standard
parametric curve represents an additional worker.hour of labour requirement,
from qmin to qmax. The stringency of the standard increases counter-clockwise.
Each mark of the uniform insurance curve represents an incremental 10% of
insurance coverage, from 0 to 100%. Insurance coverage increases counter-
clockwise.
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Figure 9. Sensitivity analysis. The welfare displayed on the vertical axis
is the average lifetime discounted welfare gross of environmental damages.
Scenario assumptions are detailed in Tables 7 and 8 .
